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INTRODUCTION 
THE EXCEPTION THAT PROVES THE POST-COMMUNIST RULE
,IRQHWDNHVDFORVHORRNDWWKHPDSRISRVWFRPPXQLVW(XURSHWRGD\RQHFDQ
argue that Bosnia-Herzegovina is the exception which proves the rule; almost all 
of the post-communist states, many of which emerged from the ruins of the former 
multinational socialist federations, are the national states of their core ethnic groups. 
These are usually but not always made up of a large ethnic majority which co-exists 
with one sizable ethnic minority or many smaller ethnic minorities. The ethnic 
diversity which used to characterize Central, South Eastern and Eastern Europe was 
substantially reduced during the twentieth century; by the end of the century truly 
multiethnic states had almost completely disappeared from the map. This is not to say 
that many states in these regions do not still harbour an ethnically diverse population. 
Indeed, many core ethnic groups do co-exist with one or many other ethnic groups. 
But, even in the countries where the percentage represented by the core ethnic group 
ZLWKLQWKHRYHUDOOSRSXODWLRQUHVWVDWRUHYHQMXVWEHORZ¿IW\(VWRQLD/DWYLDDQG
Montenegro, for instance), these states are still considered as their “national homes”.
But when one mentions the idea of a “national home” in Eastern Europe, one also 
must deal with the fact that there are some countries whose core ethnic group is closely 
related with the core ethnic group of a neighbouring country – for instance, Romania 
and Moldova, Byelorussia and Russia – or they even form the same trans-border 
nation such as the case of Kosovo and Albania. Serbs might say that Montenegrins 
are their southerly ethnic brothers (and one-third of Montenegrins would share this 
opinion)1 and Bulgarians that Macedonians are just a branch of the Bulgarian nation 
(although a large majority of Macedonians are not convinced that is the case). Some 
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would also say that Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats have their “national homes” 
in Serbia and Croatia respectively (and many of them would agree), but both Bosnian 
6HUEVDQG&URDWVWRJHWKHUZLWKWKH%RVQLDNVDUHDOVRWKHFRQVWLWXHQWSHRSOHVRI%RVQLD
Herzegovina as their common historical home. Bosnian and Herzegovinian ethnic 
0XVOLPVRSWHGLQIRUWKHUHJLRQDOQDPHWKH%RVQLDNVDVWKHQDPHRIWKHLUQDWLRQ
instead of the religious one.2 This was not to claim (although some did) that Bosnia 
as a state belongs exclusively to this group as their “national home”.3 When it comes 
to the names of peoples and countries, the name of core ethnic group and the name of 
country – regardless of whether the ethnic group gave name to the region it inhabits 
or the other way around – usually coincide. In post-communist Europe, the exceptions 
are Bosnia-Herzegovina, a regional name for a truly multinational country comprising 
three constitutive peoples with no core ethnic group, and Kosovo.4
But, today’s Bosnia is an exception in one more respect: it is one of the rare federal 
post-communist countries. It was organised under the Dayton Peace Agreement as 
a federation or even confederation of two entities, one of which is itself a federation 
of cantons.5 The post-communist countries are, as a general rule, reluctant to accept 
federal arrangements. For example, all 10 of the new EU member states from East, 
Central and Southeast Europe are unitary states (Liebich 2007: annex 5). Exceptions to 
the general rule of mono-national and unitary countries are rare and arguably limited 
WRGHIXQFWELQDWLRQDO&]HFKRVORYDNLDXQWLOLWVGLVVROXWLRQDWWKHEHJLQQLQJRI
and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia comprising Serbia and Montenegro between 
1992 and 2006 (although this union was heavily dominated by the ideology of the 
XQL¿FDWLRQRIHWKQLF6HUEODQGVLQFOXGLQJ0RQWHQHJUR
Little wonder then that today’s Bosnia as a highly federalised multiethnic country, 
ZLWKQRPDMRULW\DQGQRPLQRULWLHVLVDOVRDQH[FHSWLRQZKHQLWFRPHVWRGH¿QLWLRQV
and practices of citizenship. It is one of few countries in the world to have sub-national 
or sub-state citizenship alongside state or national citizenship.6 Following the Dayton 
Peace Agreement, Bosnia introduced a dual or two-tier citizenship i.e. every citizen 
possesses both state and entity citizenship. 
In this paper I analyse transformations of citizenship and political identities in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina in four periods. First, it is necessary to describe how Bosnian 
UHSXEOLFDQOHYHOFLWL]HQVKLSZDVGH¿QHGZLWKLQVRFLDOLVW<XJRVODYLDZKHUHFLWL]HQVKLS
was bifurcated into the federal and republican citizenships immediately after the 
Second World War. In the second part, I analyse how and to what extent the citizenship 
question played a role in democratisation and fragmentation of the Bosnian political 
scene between 1990 and 1992 and how it was used as a tool of nationalist mobilisation. 
)XUWKHUPRUH,GHVFULEHUHGH¿QLWLRQVRI%RVQLDQFLWL]HQVKLSGXULQJWKHZDU
1995). Finally, I attempt to scrutinise the structure and current functioning of Dayton 
Bosnia’s multi-layered citizenship since the Dayton Peace Agreement introduced 
two-layer (state-level and entity-level) and multiethnic citizenship (ethnically-based 
political participation). The paper further explores the possible implications of Bosnia-
Herzegovina’s eventual membership in the EU which would entail the introduction of 
European citizenship as an additional layer of Bosnian citizenship.
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1.  CITIZENSHIP IN SOCIALIST BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: 1945-1990
1.1. Explaining the Bosnian “Anomaly”
,Q WKH LQWURGXFWLRQ , GH¿QHG %RVQLD+HU]HJRYLQD DV WKH H[FHSWLRQ WR WKH
general post-communist rule that both old states (such as Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, 
Romania and Albania) as well as newly independent states which were formed where 
multinational socialist federations once stood are national states of their core ethnic 
groups. The explanation for this “anomaly”, in my opinion, is to be found within the 
<XJRVODY&RPPXQLVWV¶VROXWLRQWRWKHQDWLRQDOTXHVWLRQ,WZDVLQÀXHQFHGPRVWO\E\
the Soviet model, but it also introduced some unexpected innovations. Although the 
8665XQOLNH<XJRVODYLDKDGDQRQQDWLRQDOQRQUHJLRQDODQGSXUHO\LGHRORJLFDO
name, it was organised as a federation of ethno-national states. The Soviet solution 
to the national question in what used to be Czarist Russia and based on the Leninist 
principle of national self-determination, prescribed that major ethnic groups should 
have their own national states, whereas numerous other “nationalities” should have a 
regional autonomy within republics “owned” by their titular national group (see, for 
instance, Connor 1984, Smith 1999).
When, after its brief disappearance in April 1941, Yugoslavia was resurrected in 
1945 as a socialist multinational federation, one major difference appeared vis-à-vis the 
Soviet model. The “New Yugoslavia” was established as a federation of six republics 
(Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro), one 
autonomous province (Vojvodina) and one autonomous region (Kosovo), both of 
the latter within Serbia. The republics were established according to ethnic criteria, 
except Bosnia-Herzegovina – again the exception that proved the rule – which was 
IRUPHGDFFRUGLQJWRLWVKLVWRULFVSHFL¿FLW\ (Budding 2008). Another exception was 
the autonomous province of Vojvodina which was established because of its separate 
history from Serbia proper and its multiethnic composition and sizable ethnic minorities 
such as the Magyars (a numerous German minority was expelled or left the country 
after the war). Vojvodina would, however, soon come to be dominated by an ethnic 
Serb majority. Due to its large ethnic Albanian population, Kosovo was formed as an 
autonomous region (oblast) – a lower status than that of a province (pokrajina) – but, 
due to general reluctance of Albanians to accept yet another Yugoslav government in 
Kosovo, was immediately under martial law after the war. 
$OWKRXJKWKH\ZHUHXQGHUWKHGLUHFWLQÀXHQFHRI0RVFRZXQWLOZKHQ7LWR
split with Stalin, the Yugoslav communists’ innovations within the Soviet blueprint 
could be explained by their long-term advocacy of a federal solution for Yugoslavia. 
This was the case even when they, under Moscow’s orders between 1925 and 1934-
RI¿FLDOO\UHMHFWHGXQLWDU\DQG³ERXUJHRLV´<XJRVODYLDDOWRJHWKHUDQGGHPDQGHG
its dissolution. In their “federal vision”, Yugoslavia was supposed to comprise not only 
states for major nations, or “tribes” as they were called at the time (Slovenes, Serbs 
and Croats) but also Bosnia-Herzegovina in its historical borders and Macedonia (for 
the Yugoslav Communist solution to the national question before and after 1945, see, 
for instance, Banac 1988, Shoup 1968, Connor 1984, Djilas 1991). As early as 1924 
the Communist Party of Yugoslavia’s (CPY) “Resolution on the National Question” 
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FRQGHPQHGXQLWDULVPDQG6HUELDQERXUJHRLVKHJHPRQ\DQGDVNHGIRUDPRQJRWKHU
things, Bosnian autonomy (the document is available in Kobsa et al. 1978: 221-225). 
The CPY, along with its general secretary Josip Broz Tito, led the liberation 
movement in Yugoslavia during the war. By November 1942 the Anti-Fascist Council 
RI1DWLRQDO/LEHUDWLRQRI<XJRVODYLD$912-ZDVDOUHDG\IRUPHGLQ%LKDü%RVQLD
as a supreme legislative and executive body of the new Yugoslavia to be created after 
the liberation. In 1943 similar anti-fascist councils were constituted in Slovenia, 
&URDWLD%RVQLD+HU]HJRYLQD0RQWHQHJURDQG6DQGåDN7 and, in 1944, in Serbia and 
Macedonia. The constitution of the Land Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation 
RI%RVQLD+HU]HJRYLQD=$912%,+FRQ¿UPHG<XJRVODYFRPPXQLVWV¶GHWHUPLQDWLRQ
to establish Bosnia-Herzegovina as a unit of the future federal Yugoslavia. On its 
second session in Jajce (Bosnia) in November 1943, the AVNOJ issued a decision on 
the “building of Yugoslavia according to the federal principle”. In its second point, 
IHGHUDOLVPZDV HYRNHG DJDLQ DV WKH JRYHUQLQJ SULQFLSOH RI WKH IXWXUH<XJRVODYLD
which would provide for the full political equality of Serbs, Croats, Slovenians, 
Macedonians, and Montenegrins, or, in other words, “the peoples of Serbia, Croatia, 
Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina”. It is interesting to 
note that in one of the founding documents of the future socialist Yugoslavia the very 
GH¿QLWLRQRISHRSOHV±WKH<XJRVODYHWKQLFQDWLRQV8 and/or the peoples i.e. citizens 
of the constitutive republics – is imprecise and ambiguous. This would also have 
VLJQL¿FDQWFRQVHTXHQFHVIRUWKHIXWXUHRIWKHFRXQWU\
1.2. Dual Citizenship in Yugoslavia, Republican Citizenship in Bosnia-Herzegovina
$QRWKHUVWULNLQJGHYLDWLRQIURPWKH6RYLHWPRGHOZDVWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRIa two-
level or bifurcated citizenship in Yugoslavia in 1945, which involved the establishment 
of federal and republican-level citizenships.9 The 1945/46 Law on the citizenship of 
the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia stated that: “Every citizen of a people’s 
republic is simultaneously a citizen of the FPRY and every citizen of the FPRY is 
in principle a citizen of a people’s republic” (Art. 1, para. 2). Art. 48 of the 1946 
Constitution of the FPRY established that “every citizen of a republic enjoys in every 
republic the same rights as the citizens of that republic”.10 
It is important to mention here that in Habsburg Bosnia the 1910 Land Statute for 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (arts. 3 and 4) regulated the question of “Bosnian-Herzegovinian 
belonging”. However, in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (popularly called 
Yugoslavia and later renamed as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia) local autonomies were 
abolished and the country was divided according to geographic and not historic or ethnic 
FULWHULD7KDW<XJRVODYLDZDVIRUPHG¿UVWDVDXQLWDU\VWDWHWKLVZRXOGFKDQJHRQO\LQ
1939 with the creation of the autonomous Croatian BanovinaZDVDOVRUHÀHFWHGLQLWV
single citizenship. Curiously, the law on single Yugoslav citizenship was proclaimed in 
1928, a decade after the creation of the state itself.11 The law provided that “every citizen 
must have “home belonging” []DYLþDMQRVW] in one of the Kingdom’s municipalities” 
7KH IXOO WH[WRI WKH ODZ LV LQ7HSLü	%DãLü=DYLþDMQRVW actually 
VLJQL¿HGSHUPDQHQWPXQLFLSDOUHVLGHQFHDQGDOHJDOOLQNEHWZHHQWKHLQGLYLGXDODQG
WKHPXQLFLSDOLW\RUFRXQW\ZKHUHKHRUVKHOLYHG-RYDQRYLü=DYLþDMQRVW 
remained an important legal device up until 1945 when it constituted the basis for the 
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HVWDEOLVKPHQWRIUHSXEOLFDQFLWL]HQVKLSV-RYDQRYLü7KHUHSXEOLFDQOHYHO
laws on citizenship in socialist Yugoslavia were fashioned in order to be in harmony 
with the federal law on citizenship. In general, they were similar, but they also varied 
to a certain extent from one republic to the next. The Socialist Republic of Bosnia-
Herzegovina was established as a unitary state with a single republican citizenship.12 
However, attention was always paid to the equal representation in its political bodies 
of its three major ethnic groups.
Although, during socialist Yugoslavia, republican citizenship played an almost 
LQVLJQL¿FDQWUROHLQWKHHYHU\GD\OLIHRIWKH<XJRVODYVDIWHUWKHEUHDNXSRIWKHFRXQWU\
in late 1991, republican-level citizenship became essential for determining the initial 
citizenry of the new states. In other words, republican citizenships became the only 
strong criterion for immediate political, social and economic inclusion or exclusion. 
%XWEHIRUH,VKRZKRZFLWL]HQVKLSZDVGH¿QHGLQLQGHSHQGHQW5HSXEOLFRI%RVQLD
Herzegovina, and in what respect it differed from the practice in other former Yugoslav 
republics, it is necessary to examine the role citizenship played in the democratisation 
and ensuing ethnic fragmentation of Yugoslavia and Bosnia.
2.  CITIZENSHIP AND THE ROAD TO WAR, 1990-1992
2.1. Democratisation and Ethnic Fragmentation
The League of Communists of Yugoslavia, composed of six republican parties, 
split at its 14th extraordinary Congress in January 1990. After that precursory event 
ZKLFKDQQRXQFHGWKHEUHDNXSRIWKHFRXQWU\LWVHOIWKH<XJRVODYUHSXEOLFVVHSDUDWHO\
RUJDQLVHGWKHLU¿UVWIUHHGHPRFUDWLFHOHFWLRQVZKLFKWRRNSODFHEHWZHHQ$SULODQG
December 1990. The WLPLQJ and VHTXHQFLQJ of the republican democratic elections, 
especially the considerable time gaps between them, played an important role in the 
HOHFWRUDOSUHIHUHQFHVRIFLWL]HQV(OHFWRUDORXWFRPHVZHUHKHDYLO\LQÀXHQFHGE\LQWHU
republican and inter-ethnic quarrels. Slovenia held elections in April which brought 
victory to the centre-right pro-independence coalition. When Croatia held elections in 
$SULODQG0D\7XÿPDQ¶VQDWLRQDOLVWVZRQDQDEVROXWHPDMRULW\LQWKHSDUOLDPHQW
There then followed a huge gap (for such turbulent times) between the elections in the 
north-western republics and the subsequent elections in the south-eastern republics, 
ZKLFKZHUH¿QDOO\FDOOHGLQODWHDXWXPQ,QEULHIWKHGHPRFUDWLFDOO\HOHFWHG
mostly right-wing republican governments of Slovenia and Croatia co-existed for half 
a year with the old communist governments in Bosnia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and 
Serbia still in place. The latter two were also nationalistic. 
As early as August 1990 the local Serbs in the so-called Krajina region of Croatia 
KDGEORFNHG WKH URDGV LQRSHQGH¿DQFHRI WKHQHZ&URDWLDQ DXWKRULWLHV$PRQWK
ODWHU6HUELDDGRSWHGDQHZ&RQVWLWXWLRQFRQ¿UPLQJ WKHDEROLWLRQRI WKHDXWRQRP\
of Vojvodina and Kosovo, but retaining their two seats in the Yugoslav Presidency 
FRPSRVHGRIWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVRIVL[UHSXEOLFVDQGWZRSURYLQFHV,I0LORãHYLü¶V
bullying clearly handed the advantage to nationalist and separatist forces in Slovenia 
DQG&URDWLD LQWHUHWKQLF FRQÀLFWV LQ&URDWLD LQ WXUQ KDG D VWURQJ LPSDFW RQ WKH
electoral preferences of Bosnian, Montenegrin and Serbian citizens. Predictably, the 
nationalist parties won these elections. The nationalist reformed Communists won in 
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Serbia and Montenegro, whereas in Bosnia the nationalist anti-Communists (Serb, 
Croat and Muslim ethnic parties) formed a coalition which would have disastrous 
UHVXOWVIRUWKHFRXQWU\¶VIXWXUH,Q0DFHGRQLDQDWLRQDOLVWVKDGVWURQJEDFNLQJEXWWKH\
failed to form a government which would at that time be led by a non-partisan prime 
minister. Finally, a non-nationalist reformed communist (Kiro Gligorov) was elected 
president in early 1991. In sum, conservative nationalist political forces triumphed 
almost everywhere in Yugoslavia, even in the guise of “socialist parties”, such as 
0LORãHYLü¶V7KLVFRQ¿UPV+RURZLW]¶VREVHUYDWLRQWKDW³HWKQLFFRQÀLFWLQXQUDQNHG
V\VWHPV>XQOLNHUDQNHGV\VWHPV@XVXDOO\JRHVKDQGLQKDQGZLWKFRQVHUYDWLYHSROLWLFV´
(Horowitz 1985: 32). 
No left-leaning pan-Yugoslav party made a strong showing at the elections. In a 
EHODWHGDWWHPSWWR¿OOWKHYDFDQWVSRWOHIWE\WKH/HDJXHRI&RPPXQLVWVRI<XJRVODYLD
as the only all-Yugoslav supra-national political force, the federal prime minister Ante 
0DUNRYLüIRXQGHGWKH$OOLDQFHRI5HIRUP)RUFHV656LQWKHVXPPHURI,QVSLWH
of his all-Yugoslav popularity, due to a sharp economic recovery, he had entered the 
game too late (after elections in Slovenia and Croatia). Since the federal-level elections 
DWZKLFKKLVSDUW\FRXOGKDYHJDLQHGPRUHSROLWLFDO LQÀXHQFHQHYHU WRRNSODFH LW
participated at the republican-level elections in south-eastern republics. It predictably 
performed well in Bosnian urban centres and in Macedonia, two republics whose 
citizens were well aware that they would be the ones to pay a heavy price in the case 
RI<XJRVODYLD¶VGLVLQWHJUDWLRQDQGWKHRXWEUHDNRIHWKQLFFRQÀLFW0DUNRYLü¶VIDLOXUH
could be explained simply by the fact that in the context of ethno-politics – whose rules 
dominated the political scene at the moment of his appearance – parties which stand 
above ethnic divisions and formulate their programmes only on ideological or, as in his 
case, economic or technocratic grounds do not have much hope of electoral success. In 
the context of the ethnic fragmentation of the citizenry through a democratic electoral 
process, the general tendency among the electorates was not to vote for non-ethnic 
parties, but to opt instead for those parties which presented themselves as “guardians” 
of ethno-national interests. However, an exception to this was the urban population in 
general, particularly in large and ethnically diverse cities, which proved more resistant 
to nationalist rhetoric than voters in smaller cities or rural areas.13
7KH¿UVWGHPRFUDWLFHOHFWLRQV WKXV WRRNSODFH LQDQDWPRVSKHUHRIFRQÀLFWLQJ
nationalist aspirations. It is not surprising then that the elections revealed a strong 
EDFNLQJ IRU HWKQLF OHDGHUV DQG HWKQLF SDUWLHVZKRVHPHVVDJH RI HWKQLF VROLGDULW\
traversed republican borders. They promised to “protect” and guard the interests of 
WKHLUHWKQLFDOO\GH¿QHGHOHFWRUDWHLQWKHLQWHUUHSXEOLFDQGLQWHUHWKQLFFRQÀLFWVLQWKH
case of Yugoslavia’s disappearance. The Serb Democratic Party (SDS) was established 
LQERWK&URDWLDDQG%RVQLDDQGZDVWKHQXQGHUWKHGLUHFWLQÀXHQFHRI0LORãHYLüZKR
was already perceived (and often portrayed himself) as not only the leader of Serbia 
but of all6HUEV6LPLODUO\7XÿPDQ¶V&URDWLDQ'HPRFUDWLF8QLRQ+'=IRXQGHGD
%RVQLDQEUDQFKDQG7XÿPDQWKRXJKWKHSUHVLGHQWRIWKH5HSXEOLFRI&URDWLDIDVKLRQHG
KLPVHOIDVWKH³SUHVLGHQWRIDOO&URDWV ´$OLMD,]HWEHJRYLü¶V6'$PHDQZKLOHIRXQGHG
D6DQGåDNEUDQFK
$V LQPDQ\RWKHU SRVWFRPPXQLVW FRXQWULHV WKH¿UVW GHPRFUDWLF HOHFWLRQV LQ
Yugoslavia demonstrated the “ethno-national cartelization of opinion and electoral 

“Being Citizen the Bosnian Way”
FRPSHWLWLRQ´6NDOQLN/HII:LWKWKHGLVLQWHJUDWLRQRI<XJRVODYLDORRPLQJ
IROORZLQJWKHEUHDNXSRIWKH/&<LQ-DQXDU\FLWL]HQVEHJDQWRZRQGHUif and 
how Yugoslavia would disintegrate. The natural lines of separation were the republican 
borders, but the signal sent from the republican leaders and nationalist politicians 
VXJJHVWHGWKDWHWKQLFVHSDUDWLRQZDVWKHDLPWKHEUHDNXSRI<XJRVODYLDSUHVHQWHG
DQRSSRUWXQLW\WRUHGUDZ³DUWL¿FLDO´UHSXEOLFDQERUGHUV,QWKLVFRQWH[WWKHFRQVWDQW
communication via the republican-controlled media between the republican political 
leaderships and citizens – or more precisely nationalist leaders and their ethnic bodies 
– is essential for understanding the political dynamic of Yugoslavia’s dissolution.
2.2. Citizenship as a Factor of Disintegration
I claim that some of the fundamental questions of citizenship – namely, To what 
VWDWHGR,RZHP\OR\DOW\"$QGZKLFKVWDWHJXDUDQWHHVRUSURPLVHVWRJXDUDQWHH
P\ ULJKWV DQGSURWHFWLRQ" – FULWLFDOO\ LQÀXHQFHG WKH GHPRFUDWLVDWLRQSURFHVV DQG
Yugoslavia’s violent disintegration. Of course, it was one of many factors, although it 
LVRQHZKLFKKDVQRWVRIDUUHFHLYHGVXI¿FLHQWVFKRODUO\DWWHQWLRQ
<XJRVODYLD¶VVXEXQLWVZHUHDOOEXWRQHGH¿QHGLQHWKQRQDWLRQDOWHUPV(YHQWXDOO\
DQG SHUKDSV SUHGLFWDEO\ WKHVH HWKQLFDOO\ GH¿QHG UHSXEOLFV GLG QRW DGRSW civic 
democracy as republican communities of citizens which negotiated or confronted 
each other over the future of their common state (union or separation?). Generally, 
the democratisation of Yugoslavia reinforced the factor of ethnicity i.e. the citizen’s 
LGHQWL¿FDWLRQZLWKKLVRUKHUHWKQLFJURXS7KHGHPRFUDWLFHOHFWLRQVFRQ¿UPHGWKH
FRQÀLFWEHWZHHQRQRQHKDQGWKHFLWL]HQV¶FLYLFRUUHSXEOLFDQLGHQWLW\DQGRQWKH
other, ethnic belonging. However, the very fact that all republics (except, it should be 
QRWHGDJDLQ%RVQLDZHUHGH¿QHGDVWKH³QDWLRQDOKRPHV´RIWKHLUFRUHHWKQLFJURXS
only underlined the primacy of ethnic identity. This was even the case when the citizens 
themselves rejected ethno-nationalism and expressed a purely civic patriotism or 
loyalty to the institutions of their republics and to the Federation. These two political 
identities could be easily reconciled only if a citizen resided in his or her own ethnic 
republic and therefore belonged to its ethnic majority. However, this was not the case 
for the considerable number of individuals who lived outside the “national homes” of 
their ethnic groups and were instead inside republics to which they had historically 
belonged civically (as republican citizens) but not ethnically. 
Civic membership was thus soon eclipsed by ethnic belonging as the most important 
PDUNHURIDFLWL]HQ¶VLGHQWLW\9RMLQ'LPLWULMHYLüGHVFULEHVWKHPHFKDQLVPRIHWKQLF
LGHQWL¿FDWLRQ³LQGLYLGXDOVDUHSXVKHGQRWWRDFWSULPDULO\DVFLWL]HQVEXWDVPHPEHUVRI
the ethnic group. They are induced not to recognise any social, economic, professional 
and other interests and to behave as if all members of the ethnic group were in the 
same social position” (1998: 152). To illustrate this rejection of civic identity – by a 
JUHDWQXPEHURILQGLYLGXDOVEXWQRWE\HYHU\RQHLQ<XJRVODYLD±'LPLWULMHYLüTXRWHV
Miroslav Toholj, one of the leaders of Bosnian Serbs, who at the eve of the Bosnian 
ZDUGHFODUHGWKHIROORZLQJ³6HUEVKDYHEHHQ¿QDOO\GHSULYHGRIWKHLU6HUEQDPHthey 
have been made citizens, which they will not accept” (emphasis added, 1998: 152).
7KHHWKQRQDWLRQDOFRQFHSWLRQRIFLWL]HQVKLS¿QDOO\SUHYDLOHGDQGIXHOOHGYLROHQW
FRQÀLFWVRYHUWKHUHGH¿QLWLRQRIQDWLRQDOERUGHUVZLWKLQZKLFKWKHHWKQRQDWLRQDOVWDWHV
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were to be formed on the basis of the absolute majorities of the core ethno-national 
JURXSVVHHâWLNV'HPRFUDF\IURPWKLVYLHZSRLQWZDVVHHQDVZRUNDEOHRQO\
if it was essentially ethno-national. In other words, majority rule should not entail 
a division between an ethnic majority and an ethnic minority but rather should be 
practiced within the core ethno-national group with the majority/minority divide 
formed on the basis of ideological preferences. In this sense, a projected ethno-national 
state, territorially expanded in order to include most if not all members of the ethnic 
group, could be truly democratic only if the core ethnic group had an absolute majority 
DQGHWKQLFPLQRULWLHVZHUHUHGXFHGWRDQLQVLJQL¿FDQWSHUFHQWDJHRIWKHSRSXODWLRQ
7KHUHIRUHD³IHDURIEHFRPLQJPLQRULW\´-RYLüSXVKHGPDQ\WR¿JKWWREHWKH
³PDMRULW\´LQWKHQHZVWDWHVLQWKHPDNLQJDQGLGHDOO\ZLWKRXWKDYLQJWROHDYHWKHLU
places of residence.
This conception of citizenship, coupled with the new democratic order, fuelled 
extreme nationalism: most ethnic Serbs and ethnic Croats started to perceive Serbia or 
Croatia respectively as their states, regardless of their places of residence. They refused 
loyalty to Croatia and Bosnia (in the case of most ethnic Serbs) or to Bosnia (in the 
case of many ethnic Croats, particularly in Western Herzegovina) and hoped that their 
ethnic state’s borders would expand so as to encompass politically and legally their 
place of residence even if it were located in territories where they lived as a minority. 
These territories were to be conquered and ethnically “cleansed”, as was the case, for 
instance, of the Bosnian Serb capture of almost 70 per cent of Bosnia’s territory and 
the massive ethnic cleansing of ethnic Muslims and Croats, which accompanied this 
expansion.
2.3. “From Voting to Violence” in Bosnia
In the context of the ethnic fragmentation of Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, as 
WKHRQO\QRQHWKQLFDOO\GH¿QHGUHSXEOLFZLWKLQZKRVHERUGHUVLWZDVSK\VLFDOO\DOPRVW
impossible to draw ethnic boundaries, was to pay the heaviest price. The prevalence 
of the ethno-centric conception of citizenship which put ethnic above civic loyalty 
SDYHG WKHZD\ WR XVH WKH WLWOH RI -DFN6Q\GHU¶V ERRN  IRU WKHPRYH ³IURP
voting to violence”. In his 1996 collection of essays on Nationhood and the National 
4XHVWLRQLQ1HZ(XURSH5RJHUV%UXEDNHUH[SODLQHGWKHWULDGLFUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ
a “nationalizing state”, a “national minority” and a “national homeland”, and uses 
Croatia (nationalizing state), its ethnic Serb minority (national minority) and Serbia 
QDWLRQDOKRPHODQGDVDWH[WERRNH[DPSOHIRUWKHLQWHUHWKQLFFRQÀLFWVRI(DVWHUQ
(XURSH7KHZDULQ%RVQLDKRZHYHUGH¿HVWKHPRGHODQG%UXEDNHUDGPLWVLQWKH
ERRNWKDWKHGRHVQRWLQWHQGWRGHDOZLWKWKLVFRQÀLFW,ZLOODUJXHIXUWKHUWKDWLQWKH
case of Bosnia, it was more of an LPDJLQHG triadic relationship. Nonetheless, since the 
WULDGLFUHODWLRQVKLSLVFRQVLGHUHGDKRWEHGRIHWKQLFFRQÀLFWVLQ(DVWHUQ(XURSHLWLV
necessary to explain the Bosnian situation in exactly these terms.
Bosnia was not a “nationalizing state” to start with. Nor could it later qualify as 
one. Bosnian Serbs and Croats were not “national minorities” in this truly multinational 
country with, regardless of actual percentages, no majorities and no minorities. So far 
DV%UXEDNHU¶VWULDQJOHLVFRQFHUQHGRQO\6HUELDDQG&URDWLDZHUHSHUFHLYHGDV³H[WHUQDO
homelands” by nationalist Bosnian Serbs and Croats. The mobilisation of Bosnian 
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Serbs for war was mostly motivated by the Greater Serbia project that had already 
begun in Croatia in 1991 and was territorially inconceivable without the acquisition 
of Bosnian territories. Bosnian Serbs were not in the same position as the Croatian 
Serbs i.e. a “national minority” whose rights were threatened by a “nationalizing” 
Croatian state which deprived Serbs of their status of Croatia’s constituent people. 
Moreover, Bosnian Serb representatives were sharing power with Croat and Muslim 
ethno-nationalist parties. However, Serb nationalistic propaganda concentrated on 
portraying Bosnia as an incipient “Muslim” nationalising state and on portraying 
Bosnian Muslim leaders as “fundamentalists” plotting to subjugate or eliminate 
6HUEVLQDIXWXUH,VODPLFVWDWH(YHQWXDOO\DVLJQL¿FDQWSURSRUWLRQRI%RVQLDQ6HUEV
rejected Bosnia as an independent multinational state and decided to join Serbia (or 
VWD\LQDSROLWLFDOXQLRQZLWK%HOJUDGHWDNLQJZLWKWKHPDVPXFK%RVQLDQWHUULWRU\
as they could conquer. The majority of ethnic Serbs – but not all, especially in the big 
Bosnian cities – boycotted the referendum on independence on which 63.4 per cent of 
WKHHOLJLEOHYRWHUVPDVVLYHO\YRWHGIRULQGHSHQGHQFH7KLVGHFLVLRQZDVWDNHQLQWKH
context of Yugoslavia’s disappearance when the only other available option was to join 
the Belgrade-dominated union with Serbia and Montenegro. This option was rejected 
by almost all members of the two other ethnic groups (ethnic Muslims and Croats) 
DVZHOODVE\PDQ\SHRSOHRIPL[HGHWKQLFEDFNJURXQGDQGPDQ\PHPEHUVRIRWKHU
Bosnian nationalities (8 per cent of the population). The major Serb nationalist party 
6'6OHGE\5DGRYDQ.DUDGåLüDQGEDFNHGE\%HOJUDGHDQGWKH-1$WKXVUHMHFWHGWKH
status of a constituent people for Serbs in independent Bosnia – claiming that Serbs 
would become a minority (31 per cent of the population) in a country dominated by 
ethnic Muslims (44 per cent) and Croats (17 per cent) – and opted instead to become 
DQDEVROXWHPDMRULW\LQDJUHDWHU6HUELDQVWDWHLQWKHPDNLQJ
The case of nationalist Croats in Bosnia is slightly different, as their tactic, in 
1991 and 1992, initially was to support Bosnia’s statehood. During this period, the 
reinforcement of Bosnian statehood also entailed the reinforcement of Croatia’s bid 
for independence and the front against Serbia and Montenegro and Serb nationalists 
in Croatia and Bosnia. However, as the war progressed, in 1993, Croats in Western 
+HU]HJRYLQDDQG&HQWUDO%RVQLD±XQGHUGLUHFWLQÀXHQFHDQGFRQWUROIURPWKHQDWLRQDOLVW
government in Zagreb – adopted a position similar to that of the Bosnian Serbs. They 
rejected Bosnia as a multinational state, established their own statelet, the so-called 
Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna, portrayed Bosnian Muslims as fundamentalists, 
HQWHUHG LQWR DQ RSHQ FRQÀLFWZLWK 6DUDMHYR DQG WULHG WR JHW DVPXFK WHUULWRU\ DV
possible with the intention of attaching it to Croatia. In that respect, it is impossible 
WRVSHDNDERXWDrealWULDGLFUHODWLRQVKLS,WLVRQO\SRVVLEOHWRVSHDNRIKRZWKHWULDG
was simulated in order to legitimize ethnic Serbs’ and Croats’ ambitions to join what 
many of them perceive as their “national homelands”. 
3.  CITIZENSHIP IN WAR-TIME BOSNIA (1992-1995)
:KHQWKH%RVQLDQZDUZDVDERXWWREUHDNRXWRQ$SULODODVWDWWHPSWDW
preserving civic citizenship and civic solidarity was made. Demonstrators gathered 
in front of the Bosnian parliament in Sarajevo to protest against the nationalist 
policies of the three main ethnic parties which were clearly carrying the country into 
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a bloodletting. Their demonstration was also an act of civic courage against Bosnian 
6HUESDUDPLOLWDULHVOR\DOWR.DUDGåLüZKRZHUHDOUHDG\LQFRQWURORIVRPH%RVQLDQ
cities and some Sarajevo neighbourhoods, while the remnants of the federal army 
-1$ZLWKLWVSUHGRPLQDQWO\6HUESHUVRQQHOPRVWO\OR\DOWR6ORERGDQ0LORãHYLü
ZHUHGHSOR\LQJWKHLUWURRSVLQDQGDURXQG6DUDMHYR7KHRQO\V\PEROVDQGÀDJVWKH
GHPRQVWUDWRUVZHUHDEOHWRFDUU\LQWKHVLWXDWLRQRILPPLQHQWHWKQLFFRQÀLFWZHUHWKH
ÀDJVRIVRFLDOLVW<XJRVODYLDDQGVRFLDOLVW%RVQLD+HU]HJRYLQD±DUHGÀDJZLWKDVPDOO
<XJRVODYÀDJLQLWVXSSHUOHIWFRUQHU±DVZHOODVSRUWUDLWVRI7LWR7KH\ZHUHREYLRXVO\
using the symbols of the state which emphasised supra-national civic solidarity and 
loyalty without forgetting ethnic balances. The images of Tito were there mostly 
as symbols of long-term peace, prosperity and a promise, for so many people, of a 
better future than the one offered by nationalist leaders. But, it was, as so often, too 
little too late. The demonstrators occupied the Parliament and wanted to chase away 
Bosnian Serb paramilitaries from their outposts around the Parliament. Serb snipers 
UDQGRPO\¿UHGDWWKHFURZGWKDWJDWKHUHGDWDEULGJHDFURVVWKH0LOMDFNDULYHU7ZR
\RXQJZRPHQZHUHNLOOHGRQWKHVSRWDQHWKQLF0XVOLPIURP'XEURYQLNDQGDQHWKQLF
Croat from Sarajevo. The war began the following day, on 6 April, the anniversary of 
the day of Sarajevo’s liberation from the Nazis in 1945. It is an irony of history that 
on that same date in 1992 the remnants of the national-liberation army (the Partisans) 
that had liberated Sarajevo in 1945 joined forces with ethnic Serb militias which, to 
PDNHPDWWHUVHYHQZRUVHSRUWUD\HGWKHPVHOYHVDVIROORZHUVRIWKHZDUWLPHHQHPLHV
RIWKH3DUWLVDQVWKH&KHWQLNV±DQGDWWDFNHGWKHFLW\
7KHRXWEUHDNRIZDUDOVRFRLQFLGHGZLWKWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHFRJQLWLRQRI%RVQLD
Herzegovina. Obviously in these circumstances the questions related to the legal 
GH¿QLWLRQRIFLWL]HQVKLSDQGLQLWLDOFLWL]HQU\RIQHZO\LQGHSHQGHQWFRXQWU\ZHUHQRW
on the top of the government’s agenda. However, six months later the war presidency 
issued a decree on citizenship of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (6 October 1992) 
which was later amended twice during 1993.14 It was grounded, as in other Yugoslav 
republics, on maintaining legal continuity between the former republican citizenship 
and the citizenship of the newly independent country. Thus, Bosnian citizenship was 
guaranteed to all holders of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s republican citizenship. Bosnia-
Herzegovina’s wartime government also adopted a liberal and inclusive approach 
with regard to the citizenship status of those residents (citizens of other Yugoslav 
republics) who did not have Bosnian republican citizenship. It also formally permitted 
dual citizenship. 
Being a truly multi-ethnic country with no majority group, as a state, Bosnia 
behaved differently than other Yugoslavia’s successor states. Generally, once Yugoslavia 
disappeared, citizens of other Yugoslav republics residing in another republic often 
– especially if their ethnicity was different from ethnic majority – faced enormous 
GLI¿FXOWLHVLQUHJXODWLQJWKHLUVWDWXV7KHEHVWNQRZQFDVHLVWKDWRI the Erased in 
Slovenia, but in reality many similar problems arose throughout former Yugoslavia (see 
âWLNV3HMLü0HGYHG81+&5'LNDet al. 1998, Imeri 2006). 
Nationalist elites of the successor states mostly attempted to reduce ethnic heterogeneity 
within their boundaries and to create “pure” or “purer” ethno-national states the territorial 
shape of which would be decided either militarily or by mutual agreements between 

“Being Citizen the Bosnian Way”
WKRVHHOLWHV7KLVZDVFRQ¿UPHGWKURXJKWKHSUDFWLFHRIFRQVWLWXWLRQDOQDWLRQDOLVP
(Hayden 1992) and, frequently, through citizenship legislation. The legislative “ethnic 
engineering”, as I call it, aimed at numerically reinforcing the ethnic majority and 
UHGXFLQJWKHQXPEHURIRWKHUHWKQLFLWLHVLQWKHFLWL]HQU\RIWKHQHZVWDWHVâWLNV
This process was also intimately related to democratic procedure itself and to the fact 
that only citizens would be invited to participate in the political arena and, ultimately, 
allowed to vote. Therefore, the inclusion of the members of the core ethnic group, 
regardless of their places of residence (inside or outside state borders), and the parallel 
exclusion – as much as possible – of members of other ethnic groups (especially if 
they were citizens of other republics) was one of the strategies most crucial to the 
transformation of socialist Yugoslavia’s multinational space into a series of ethnically 
homogenized democratic states.
%RVQLD+HU]HJRYLQD¶VFLWL]HQVKLSODZZDV¿UVWDPHQGHGLQ$SULO,WGHFODUHG
that all SFRY citizens residing on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina on 6 April 1992 
should automatically be considered citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina, regardless of their 
former republican citizenship (art. 29).15 Interestingly, amongst the former Yugoslav 
FRXQWULHVWKLVLVWKHRQO\FLWL]HQVKLSODZFRPSDUDEOHWR5RJHUV%UXEDNHU¶V³QHZVWDWH
PRGHO ´WKDWZDVRWKHUZLVHXVHGLQVRPHH[8665UHSXEOLFV%UXEDNHULQVRIDU
as it determined the initial citizenry in a very inclusive manner – basically declaring 
lawful citizens all residents on the territory – and came very close to “collective 
QDWXUDOL]DWLRQ´0XPLQRYLü16 Nevertheless, the 1993 amendments which 
eliminated the birth or residency principles which were necessary for acquiring Bosnian 
FLWL]HQVKLSZHUH LQWHUSUHWHG LQ WKH81+&5UHSRUWDV UHÀHFWLQJ WKH%RVQLD
Herzegovina war government’s political intention to ensure that all of the country’s 
UHVLGHQWVZRXOGIXOO\SDUWLFLSDWHLQWKHIXO¿OPHQWRIWKHLUPLOLWDU\REOLJDWLRQDUW17 
Since they were adopted within the context of the violent ethnic fragmentation of 
the country, these laws applied only to the territories which were under the effective 
control of the Sarajevo government. In other words, its application was virtually 
impossible in the parts of the country which were controlled by the self-proclaimed and 
internationally unrecognized Serb and Croat political entities. In addition, it is important 
WRPHQWLRQWKDWWKHEUHDNDZD\Republika Srpska, under the political domination of 
.DUDGåLü¶V6HUE'HPRFUDWLF3DUW\DQGLWVPLOLWDU\DSSDUDWXVDGRSWHGLWVRZQODZRQ
“Serb citizenship” in December 1992. The law itself was, unsurprisingly, considered 
“problematic” owing to its “ethnic overtones” (UNCHR 1997: 30).
4.  MULTI-LAYERED CITIZENSHIP IN DAYTON BOSNIA
4.1. How do we de!ne the Bosnian Leviathan?
Observers of Dayton Bosnia rarely miss a chance to single out the curiosity and 
uncommonness of the country’s constitution and function. The underlying assumption 
is, of course, that a more or less ethnically, culturally or linguistically homogenous 
DQGXQLWDU\QDWLRQVWDWHLV³QRUPDO ´DQGWKHUHIRUHWKHQRUP,QGHHGRQHUDUHO\¿QGVD
political arrangement which is comprised of one state, two entities, one district and three 
SHRSOHV)XUWKHUPRUHLWLVDIHGHUDOFRQIHGHUDOVWDWHRIWZRHWKQLFDOO\GH¿QHGHQWLWLHV
WKH6HUERQHDQGWKH%RVQLDN&URDWRQHWKHIRUPHUEHLQJDXQLWDU\PRQRQDWLRQDO
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republic as its name Republika Srpska56LWVHOIGH¿QHVDQGWKHODWWHUDELQDWLRQDO
federation of ten autonomous cantons with a rather neutral name – more suitable for 
the country itself – of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (FBH). To the Dayton 
PRVDLFRQHPXVWDGGWKHGLVWULFWRI%UþNRLQQRUWKHDVW%RVQLDDVHOIJRYHUQLQJERG\
which basically acts as a multi-ethnic third entity “owned” by two entities but placed 
under the direct sovereignty of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina18 (on features of the 
'D\WRQ&RQVWLWXWLRQVHHâDUþHYLüDQG%DOD]VVHHDOVRWKHFRQWULEXWLRQV
E\0XMNLüDVZHOODV-RQHVLQWKLVYROXPH
We should also mention here that the Dayton Peace Agreement changed the 
name of the country. The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was succeeded by Bosnia-
Herzegovina. It is not clear how this almost imperceptible change actually happened. 
Nomen est omen here as well. It seems that the Serb representatives in Dayton insisted 
on stripping Bosnia-Herzegovina of any of the republican identity which they wanted 
to reserve for their own entity. Thus, while the RS is unitary in character, and the 
other entity is a federation of cantons, “Bosnia-Herzegovina” is just a name given to 
a loose union. 
6RIDUDV WKHGH¿QLWLRQRI WKLVXQFRPPRQXQLRQ LVFRQFHUQHGFRPPHQWDWRUV
citizens and politicians have been unable to agree whether Bosnia is a federal or a 
confederal state. Immediately after the war, Bosnia-Herzegovina was without doubt 
a confederal state. Its territory was divided into three zones which were controlled 
by three different armies. The FBH struggled to integrate its cantons controlled by 
HWKQLF&URDWDQG%RVQLDNQDWLRQDOLVWHOLWHVZKLOHWKH56ZLWK5DGRYDQ.DUDGåLüVWLOO
LQRI¿FHRUDERXWWROHDYHWKHSROLWLFDOVFHQHDQGJRXQGHUJURXQGGLGQRWVKRZDQ\
interest in integrating with the rest of the country. The Bosnian state was extremely 
ZHDNDQGFRPSOHWHO\GHSHQGHQWRQWKHHQWLWLHVZKLFKIXUWKHUPRUHKDGDULJKWWRHQWHU
into confederal agreements with Croatia and Serbia. 
Fourteen years later, the FBH is an integrated entity and the physical entities’ 
borders no longer exist. There is one state army (though two police structures), one 
PRQHWDU\V\VWHPZLWKWKH&HQWUDO%DQNWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQDO&RXUWRI%L+DFRPPRQ
external border control, and more effective state institutions and the Parliament. In this 
respect Bosnia could qualify as a federation, albeit only a loose one. A full integration 
of the country has indeed failed. Although the Constitutional Court concluded on 1 
July 2000 that the entities were under the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
that the Bosnian Constitution had supremacy over the constitutions of both the FBH 
and the RS,19 the real power is still within the entities which have their own police 
VWUXFWXUHVPD\RSHQIRUHLJQDIIDLUV¶RI¿FHVDEURDGDQGKDYHFRQWURORIWKHLUUDLOZD\V
telecommunications, education, and electric systems (on whether Bosnia is a federal 
VWDWHRUDXQLRQRIVWDWHVVHHâDUþHYLü(VSHFLDOO\VLQFH0LORUDG'RGLN
came to power in the RS in 2006, the reforms aimed at a closer integration have 
stalled. Moreover, during numerous discussions on the constitutional reforms of 
Dayton Bosnia, the representatives of the RS insisted on the confederal elements of 
the country’s current and future political and economic structures.
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4.2. Multi-Layered Citizenship in Dayton Bosnia
+RZGRHVFLWL]HQVKLS¿WLQWRWKLVSLFWXUH",WLVFOHDUWKDWFLWL]HQVKLSFDQQRWEH
separated from the general political structure of the country. The Dayton Agreement 
introduced two-level20 and multiethnic citizenship. In legal terms, there are state-
level and entity-level citizenships. A citizen’s “entity citizenship” is determined by 
her or his place of residence before the war (i.e. before 6 April 1992), unless she or he 
currently resides in another entity. There is also a curious case of citizens from the 
GLVWULFWRI%UþNR$OWKRXJK%UþNRLVQRWde facto a part of any of the two entities but de 
jure belongs to both entities, its citizens may choose what entity citizenship they wish 
WRKDYH%RVQLD¶VFLWL]HQVKLSFRXOGEHGH¿QHGDVmulti-ethnic insofar as all political 
participation of citizens is grounded in ethnic belonging i.e. citizens enter the political 
arena only as members of one of the three constituent ethnic groups (see below).
Bosnia’s bifurcated citizenship recalls Yugoslavia’s two-level citizenship. As 
it was in Yugoslavia before, the question of primacy between entity citizenship 
and state citizenship is also on the table. It is also one of the elements which could 
help resolve the puzzle of whether Bosnia is a federal or a confederal country. The 
answer, however, is not straightforward. On the one hand, some legal experts believe 
WKDWWKH'D\WRQ3HDFH$JUHHPHQWJUDQWVSULPDF\WRWKHHQWLWLHV0XPLQRYLü
84-86), whereas, on the other, a person’s entity citizenship is considered a derivative 
of her or his Bosnia-Herzegovinian citizenship, which thereby provides the common 
denominator (UNHCR 1997). The latter view is supported by the fact that, in spite of 
WKHHWKQLFGH¿QLWLRQRIWKHHQWLWLHVWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQRIWKHFRXQWU\SURYLGHVWKDWDOO
constitutive peoples and all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina are equal within its 
WHUULWRU\7KH/DZRQ&LWL]HQVKLSDI¿UPVWKDWWKH\³VKDOOHQMR\WKHSURWHFWLRQRI
those rights […] under the same conditions and regardless of their entity citizenship” 
(art. 3). In January 2003 new uniform identity cards were introduced and a central 
database of all Bosnian citizens was established. The identity cards do not state which 
HQWLW\FLWL]HQVKLSDSHUVRQKDVDOWKRXJKWKHFHUWL¿FDWHRI%RVQLDQFLWL]HQVKLSVWDWHV
both state and entity citizenship. In this context, it is interesting to note that each of 
the entities and the cantons in the FBH has the right to issue Bosnian passports, but 
WKHUHLVQHYHUWKHOHVVDFHQWUDOUHJLVWU\RIWKHFRXQWU\¶VFLWL]HQVXQOLNHLQWKHIRUPHU
<XJRVODYLDZKLFKRQO\KDGUHSXEOLFDQUHJLVWULHV
Just as was the case in socialist Yugoslavia, so in today’s Bosnia we deal with 
what could be termed a federal citizenship contract. Classical citizenship entails a 
bipolar relationship between citizens and aliens, whereas citizenship in a federation 
is characterized by a WULDQJXODU relationship between citizens of the member states, 
citizens of the federation and aliens (Beaud 2002: 317-318). This is especially so if 
WKHUHLVDOHJDOO\GH¿QHGPXOWLOD\HUHGFLWL]HQVKLS,FDOOWKLVWULDQJXODUUHODWLRQVKLS
a federal citizenship contract, which involves offering equal rights to all federal 
citizens over the federation’s territory, regardless of their federated or sub-state 
identity or citizenship. In that respect, in July 2000, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-
Herzegovina  eclared unconstitutional certain portions of the entities’ constitutions 
which granted the constituent people status only to their ethnic groups and not to all 
three groups throughout Bosnia in both entities as stated in the Bosnian Constitution. 
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4.3. Multi-Ethnic Citizenship, Ethnopolitics, and its Civic Subversions
Nevertheless, according to Annex 4 of the Dayton Peace Agreement, all political 
participation by citizens and all state institutions are regulated by strict ethnic quotas. 
State institutions include a bicameral Parliamentary Assembly, a three-member 
3UHVLGHQF\D&RXQFLORI0LQLVWHUVD&RQVWLWXWLRQDO&RXUWDQGD&HQWUDO%DQN$OOWKHVH
institutions must represent equally the three constituent peoples: Serb representatives 
DUHHOHFWHGIURPWKH56DQG&URDWDQG%RVQLDNUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVIURPWKH)%+7KH
passing of decisions requires an ethnic consensus. The Dayton Constitution also 
guarantees an ethnic “vital interest” right to veto whereby representatives of the 
FRQVWLWXHQWSHRSOHVDQGPHPEHUVRIWKH3UHVLGHQF\PD\EORFNDQ\GHFLVLRQMXGJHGWR
be detrimental to their people’s interests. Although the citizenship law and the above-
mentioned decision of the Constitutional Court underline the ideas that all citizens 
should enjoy equal rights throughout Bosnia and that all three groups are constituent in 
ERWKHQWLWLHVSROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQDQGYRWLQJLVHWKQLFDOO\GH¿QHGDQGHQWLW\EDVHG
Bosnian contemporary politics is essentially ethnopolitics, where a little room is left 
WRQRQHWKQLFVWDWHOHYHORUFLYLFSROLWLFDOLGHQWLWLHVDQGLQLWLDWLYHVVHH0XMNLü
DQG9ODLVDYOMHYLü
As an example, according to art. 5 of the Constitution, the three members of the 
Presidency representing Bosnia’s three constituent peoples are not elected at the state 
OHYHOEXWDWWKHOHYHORIWKHHQWLWLHVRQH&URDWDQGRQH%RVQLDNDUHHOHFWHGIURPWKH
territory of the FBH and one Serb from the territory of the RS. This means that a 
%RVQLDQFLWL]HQRI%RVQLDNHWKQLFEDFNJURXQGOLYLQJLQWKH56FDQRQO\YRWHIRUWKH
Serb representative. It also means that he cannot vote for “his” ethnic representative 
in the Presidency; he or she is elected with the votes from the FBH. In turn, the Serb 
representative does not represent the Serbs living in the FBH, but only those who voted 
for him or her in the RS. The combination of ethnic and territorial principles thus 
undermines the general principle of equal ethnic representation: not all members of 
the three ethnic groups are equally represented. Indeed they cannot even vote for their 
ethnic representatives nor can they stand in elections if they happen to reside outside 
their ethnic entity. The electoral rules also imply ethnically homogenous territories, 
or, in other words, those living in other group’s entity (RS) or in other groups’ entity 
(FBH) are in a minority position which is clearly inconsistent with the three constituent 
people rule and their equality throughout the territory. In reality, Bosnia is divided in 
three zones in which each group has an absolute majority and other groups are treated 
as and feel as minorities. The international community in Bosnia hoped that the return 
of refugees to their pre-war places of residence would change the consequences of 
WKHZDUDQGHWKQLFFOHDQVLQJ$OWKRXJKPDQ\UHIXJHHVGLGUHWXUQWKH¿QDOUHVXOWLV
meagre (Guzina 2007). To illustrate this, the population of 1991 in what is now the RS 
ZDVPDGHXSRISHUFHQW6HUEVSHUFHQW%RVQLDNVDQGSHUFHQW&URDWV,Q
there were 97 per cent Serbs. Today the population is around 75-80 per cent Serb. In 
WKHRWKHUHQWLW\LQWKHUHZHUHSHUFHQW%RVQLDNVSHUFHQW&URDWVDQG
SHUFHQW6HUEV,QDOPRVWSHUFHQWZHUH%RVQLDNVDQGWRGD\DURXQGSHU
FHQWDUH%RVQLDNVDQGWRDOHVVHUH[WHQW&URDWV*X]LQD
$OWKRXJK%RVQLDLVRI¿FLDOO\DFRXQWU\ZLWKQRPDMRULW\DQGQRPLQRULW\WKHUHLV
however, a sizable minority in Bosnia comprising all citizens who do not belong to the 
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WKUHHFRQVWLWXHQWSHRSOHV7KH\DUHRI¿FLDOO\FDOOHGWKH2WKHUV and represent around 
SHUFHQWRIWKHSRSXODWLRQ$PRQJWKHPRQH¿QGVIRULQVWDQFHRWKHU6RXWK6ODYLF
ethnicities, Jews, the Roma, and, mostly, individuals with mixed ethnic origins who 
UHIXVHWRGHFODUHWKHLUEHORQJLQJWRRQHRIWKUHHRI¿FLDOHWKQLFLWLHV7KH\JHQHUDOO\
have the same rights but are not entitled to be elected to the state Presidency and other 
HWKQLFDOO\GH¿QHGSRVLWLRQVVXFKDVUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVDW WKH+RXVHRI3HRSOHVRI WKH
Bosnian Parliamentary Assembly. This obvious discrimination, which is inconsistent 
with the general principle of equality for all citizens, resulted in 2006 and 2007 in three 
lawsuits against Bosnia-Herzegovina before the European Court of Human Rights. 
Bosnia was brought before the Court by members of Jewish and Roma communities 
DQGE\D%RVQLDNIURPWKH56,Q'HFHPEHUWKH&RXUWGHFLGHGLQIDYRXURI
'HUYR6HMGLüRI5RPDRULJLQDQG-DNRE)LQFLRI-HZLVKRULJLQMXGJLQJWKDWSUHYHQWLQJ
a Roma or a Jewish person from standing for election to the House of Peoples or for 
the State Presidency amounts to discrimination and breaches their electoral rights.21 
The ruling should result in a reform of the electoral procedures. As things stand today, 
the 2WKHUV could enter the political structures as elected representatives of mostly non-
HWKQLFSDUWLHVLGHRORJLFDOO\QRWHWKQLFDOO\GH¿QHGSDUWLHVEXWRQO\LQWKH+RXVHRI
Representatives of the Parliament. The Council of Europe has repeatedly demanded 
FKDQJHVWRWKHHOHFWRUDOSURFHGXUHVVLQFHWKH\DUHLQREYLRXVFRQÀLFWZLWKWKH(XURSHDQ
&RQYHQWLRQRQ+XPDQ5LJKWVVHHâDUþHYLü
0RUHVSHFL¿FDOO\LWFDQEHVDLGWKDWWKHQRQHWKQLFSDUWLHV±DOPRVWLQHYLWDEO\
the left-leaning parties such as the Social-Democratic Party or recently established 
1DãD6WUDQND>2XU3DUW\@±DQGLQGHSHQGHQWFLWL]HQV¶PRYHPHQWVVXFKDV³'RVWD´
>(QRXJK@DUHSULPDU\DJHQWVRIFLYLFVXEYHUVLRQRIWKHHWKQLFSULQFLSOH2QHRIWKH
PRVWVLJQL¿FDQWVXEYHUVLRQVRIWKHZKROH'D\WRQV\VWHPRFFXUUHGGXULQJWKH
HOHFWLRQVZKHQäHOMNR.RPãLüIURPWKH6RFLDO'HPRFUDWLF3DUW\VXFFHVVRURI WKH
former League of Communists of Bosnia-Herzegovina) was elected as the Croat 
representative in the Presidency with the votes coming from his sympathizers regardless 
RIWKHLUHWKQLFEDFNJURXQG,QRWKHUZRUGVPDQ\QRQ&URDWVGHFLGHGWRJLYHWKHLU
votes in the FBH to a future Croat representative – rather than to their own ethnic 
candidate – because they shared with him the same political and ideological values. 
This is clearly a scenario the Dayton Peace Agreement did not anticipate.
4.4. Dual Citizenship and Complicated Loyalties in Bosnia-Herzegovina
When dealing with the citizenship issue in Bosnia one cannot fail to mention that 
a considerable number of Bosnian citizens possess the citizenship of another country. 
Art. 4 of the Law on Citizenship of Bosnia-Herzegovina allows for double citizenship 
provided there is a bilateral agreement between Bosnia and the state in question. 
7KHLVVXHLVDVHQVLWLYHRQHIRUDOORIWKHHWKQLFJURXSVVLQFHDVLJQL¿FDQWQXPEHURI
ethnic Croats hold Croatian citizenship,22 many ethnic Serbs hold Serbian citizenship 
or could apply for it and there are numerous Bosnian refugees (the highest percentage 
RIZKRPDUHHWKQLF%RVQLDNVZKRKDYHVLQFHDFTXLUHGWKHFLWL]HQVKLSRIWKHFRXQWULHV
to which they emigrated. Since many countries do not have bilateral agreements of 
this sort and are reluctant to sign them, and since deputies from the Serb entity have 
RQVHYHUDORFFDVLRQVEORFNHGWKHUHPRYDORIDUWWKHODUJHQXPEHURI%RVQLDQVLQ
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possession of dual citizenship are worried about the eventual outcome. However, the 
High Representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina decided to postpone the deadline for 
concluding bilateral agreements until 2013.
The dual citizenship of so many citizens gives another dimension to multi-
OD\HUHG%RVQLDQFLWL]HQVKLS'RXEOHFLWL]HQVKLS OLQNVPDQ\%RVQLDQVSULPDULO\ WR
neighbouring states such as Croatia and Serbia but also to some immigration countries 
such as the US, Canada, the Netherlands or Sweden. By some estimates, more than 
800,000 people living in Bosnia have Croatian citizenship.23 This exceeds the number 
of ethnic Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina almost all of whom, due to the ethnocentric 
GH¿QLWLRQRI&URDWLDQFLWL]HQVKLSDUHHQWLWOHGWR&URDWLDQFLWL]HQVKLSVHH5DJD]]LDQG
âWLNV6LQFHWKHQHZODZRQ6HUELDQFLWL]HQVKLSLQFRQ¿UPHGLQ
basically opens the doors to Serbian citizenship to all ethnic Serbs regardless of their 
place of residence, one could expect that many ethnic Serbs in Bosnia (around one 
million persons) would acquire this additional citizenship as well.24 If we also add 
the fact that many refugees and immigrants have citizenship of the host countries 
DQGNHHSWKHLU%RVQLDQFLWL]HQVKLSDQGUHVLGHQFHZHFRXOGFRPHWRDURXJKHVWLPDWH
that approximately a half of the Bosnian population has dual or, in some instances, 
multiple citizenships.
Politically the consequences have been already felt. The Croatian electoral law has 
created a special electoral constituency that allows those Croatian citizens who form 
the “diaspora” (including the “near abroad”) to vote in the Croatian parliamentary 
and presidential elections. The law was designed in the 1990s by the nationalist 
government to bring as many seats as possible – ten per cent of the Representatives 
LHVHDWV±WR)UDQMR7XÿPDQ¶V&URDWLDQ'HPRFUDWLF8QLRQ6LQFHWKHVHDWV
have been attributed on the basis of voter turnout. Nevertheless, it is not uncommon 
to see nationalist Croatian politicians campaigning among Bosnian Croats or to see 
WKHLUELOOERDUGVLQGRZQWRZQ6DUDMHYRVHH5DJD]]LDQGâWLNV0DQ\&URDWV
especially from the border regions with Croatia do have not only dual citizenship but 
a dual residency in Bosnia and Croatia and – due to the proximity of Croatia – often 
vote at the Croatian local elections as well. On the other hand, not all Croatian citizens 
abroad and in Bosnia vote at these elections. Actually, of 405,092 registered voters 
abroad only 90,482 (mostly in Croat-populated Western Herzegovina) voted at the 
2007 elections.25 Nevertheless, we would certainly witness an even more complicated 
situation and general “loyalty crisis” (already present in the situation of Bosnian Croats) 
if, for instance, Serbia decides to allow Serbian citizens abroad (mostly in Bosnia) to 
vote at its elections as well. 
4.5. From Ethnic Fragmentation Towards European Integration? EU Citizenship as 
Yet Another Layer
Bosnia-Herzegovina signed the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the 
EU in 2008 and, in general terms, the EU has promised “a European future” to the 
:HVWHUQ%DONDQVIRUDGHWDLOHGGLVFXVVLRQVHH%HFKHYLQWKLVYROXPH+HUHLVQRW
WKHSODFHWRGLVFXVVHVWLPDWHVRIKRZORQJLWPLJKWWDNHIRUWKH:HVWHUQ%DONDQVWDWHV
to join the EU, but it would however be interesting to contemplate what effect eventual 
(8PHPEHUVKLSRI%RVQLDDQGRWKHUIRUPHU<XJRVODYFRXQWULHVPLJKWKDYHRQVSHFL¿F
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multi-layered and multi-ethnic Bosnian citizenship. Obviously, EU membership entails 
the introduction of European citizenship as well. In other words, already existing layers 
of Bosnian citizenship will acquire yet another one, the European layer, the access to 
which would, however, only be possible via Bosnian state citizenship. 
,WZRXOGEHQHYHUWKHOHVVDQLQWHUHVWLQJVLWXDWLRQERWKVRWRVSHDNvertically and 
horizontally. Vertically, there would be three levels of citizenship: entity, state and 
European level. Horizontally, on the other hand, EU citizenship of citizens of all former 
<XJRVODYUHSXEOLFVZRXOGPDNHUHGXQGDQWWKHTXHVWLRQRIGXDOFLWL]HQVKLSH[FHSWIRU
those holding a non-EU citizenship), especially when it comes to delicate relations 
between Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia. It would, politically, lower the importance of state 
borders and their relation to the territorial diffusion of ethnic groups. Finally, it would 
be interesting to observe how free movement and electoral rights attached to the EU 
FLWL]HQVKLSZRXOGLQÀXHQFHIXWXUHSROLWLFDOODQGVFDSHLQZKDWXVHGWREH<XJRVODYLD
(for European experiences on this matter see Shaw 2007). 
EPILOGUE  
ON NECESSITY OF EXCEPTIONS, OR WHY THE BOSNIAN EXCEPTION IS CRUCIAL 
FOR THE POST-COMMUNIST RULE
Observers of democratisations in countries with a high degree of ethno-national 
diversity often quote (quite uncritically) the classic liberal authority John Stuart Mill, 
who claims in his Considerations on Representative Government (1861) that “democracy 
is next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities”. Donald Horowitz 
observes that “democracy is exceptional in severely divided societies, and the claim 
has repeatedly been advanced that democracy cannot survive in the face of serious 
ethnic divisions” (Horowitz 1985: 681). According to Philip Roeder, the post-communist 
H[SHULHQFHGHPRQVWUDWHVWKDW³GHPRFUDF\LVXQOLNHO\WRVXUYLYHLQHWKQLFDOO\SOXUDO
societies” (1999: 855). Roeder is one of those scholars worried about the “third wave 
of democracy” and who claim to have statistical evidence that “successful democratic 
transitions are improbable when national revolutions are incomplete” (1999: 856). In 
Roeder’s view national revolutions must be completed, whereas “improbable projects” 
such as multinational federal Bosnia are, he argues, “short-sighted” (1999: 855-856). 
It is interesting to observe how the views of democracy promoters and of nationalist 
leaders in many emerging democracies exhibit strong similarities. In fact, democracy 
promoters very often encourage nationalist politicians – although sometimes they worry 
about their human rights records – through their own claims that democracy is possible 
only with a solid ethnic majority, or failing this, a peaceful and complacent minority. 
“In the post-communist world”, Roeder continues, “stable democracy has triumphed 
only in countries that have solved their nation-ness problem. That is, democratization 
has been most successful in states that are both older and more homogeneous. No 
states that are both new and diverse are democracies” (1999: 860). To insist on ethnic 
homogeneity as a pre-condition for liberal democracy in Eastern Europe is essentially 
to advocate a system of ethnically “pure” and separated territories. But to achieve such 
ethnic “purity”, or at least to reduce ethnic plurality, as demonstrated in the former 
Yugoslavia and in some post-Soviet regions, requires the massive employment of non-
democratic methods involving human rights’ violations, violence against civilians, 
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H[SXOVLRQVDQGXOWLPDWHO\PDVVNLOOLQJV$IWHUDOOKLVWRULFDOO\WKLVLVKRZPRVWRI³ROG
Europe” and almost all of “new Europe” achieved their ethno-national homogeneity 
and a “democratic peace”. 
In conclusion to this paper, which has attempted to trace profound transformations 
of citizenship and political identities in Bosnia-Herzegovina in its recent history, I 
will only add one more note on the necessity of the exceptions. In post-communist 
Europe, the only exception (Bosnia-Herzegovina) is crucial for the rule (national states 
of core ethnic groups), not only to prove it, but also to remind those who advocate it of 
what was there before (a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-lingual diversity), and 
how the rule actually became the rule (by employment of massive violence). Bosnia-
Herzegovina is also there to constantly question the rule and its validity and to remind 
us that what the rule is today was not the rule yesterday and may not necessarily be 
the rule tomorrow.
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IRUWKHLUXVHIXOFRPPHQWVDQGVXJJHVWLRQV$OOXQQRWLFHGPLVWDNHVQHHGOHVVWRVD\
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“The Europeanisation of Citizenship in the Successor States of the Former Yugoslavia” 
&,76(((XURSHDQ5HVHDUFK&RXQFLO&RQWDFWLVWLNV#HGDFXN
1 Montenegro is an interesting case. The country’s regional name became the name of an 
ethnic group, the Montenegrins. However, many Montenegrins were confused about 
whether they constituted a separate nation or were just a branch of the Serbian nation. 
7KLVLQWHUQDOFRQÀLFWKDGPDQ\SROLWLFDOWZLVWVDQGWXUQVLQWKHWZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\$W
the 1991 census 62 per cent of the population declared their ethnicity as Montenegrin, 
only 9 per cent as Serb and 4 per cent as ethnic Yugoslavs. The 1990s were dominated 
E\WKHLGHRORJ\RIDQDWLRQDOXQL¿FDWLRQZLWKWKH6HUEVDOWKRXJKE\WKHHQGRIV
the Montenegrin leadership – including politicians such as current prime minister Milo 
ĈXNDQRYLüZKRDGYRFDWHGWKHLGHDRIXQLRQSROLWLFDODQGQDWLRQDOZLWK6HUELDLQHDUO\
DQGPLGV±WRRNDVKDUSWXUQWRZDUGVLQGHSHQGHQFH+RZHYHUWKHFHQVXV
showed a different ethnic picture: only 43 per cent of the population declared as ethnic 
0RQWHQHJULQVZKHUHDVSHUFHQWDV6HUEVRWKHUPDMRUJURXSVEHLQJ%RVQLDNVDQG
ethnic Muslims (12 per cent), and Albanians (5 per cent). Although this schism torments 
Montenegrin body politics, and although ethnic Montenegrins are not a majority in 
their own country (but are numerically the strongest group), they should be considered 
Montenegro’s core ethnic group.
2 For a detailed analysis see Sevan Pearson’s paper in this volume.
3 7KH%RVQLDNVDVVXFKGRQRWKDYHWKHLURZQH[FOXVLYH³QDWLRQDOKRPH ´7KH\KDYHD
state – Bosnia-Herzegovina – that they share with two other ethnic groups and this state 
LV³WKHKRPH´WRDOO%RVQLDQFLWL]HQV,QWKH6DQGåDNUHJLRQLQ6HUELDDQG0RQWHQHJUR
DQGHOVHZKHUHPDQ\6RXWK6ODYLF0XVOLPVDOVRDGRSWHGWKH%RVQLDNQDPHDOWKRXJK
some still declare themselves as ethnic Muslims), although they live outside the regions 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and thus could not claim Bosnia-Herzegovina – which is 
furthermore, as explained above, a truly multi-national country – as their “national 
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homeland”. However, many see Sarajevo as their national and cultural capital and often 
PLJUDWHWKHUHWRVWXG\RUZRUN
4 Kosovo has a regional name too, but is predominantly populated by ethnic Albanians 
(more than 90%) as its core ethnic group. Nevertheless, since Kosovo Albanians have 
now their own state and since historically they were not part of Albanian state (save for 
a brief period during Italian fascist occupation), and provided that there is no “national 
XQL¿FDWLRQ´RIWZRHWKQLF$OEDQLDQVWDWHVWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIDQLQGHSHQGHQW.RVRYR
might initiate in the long-run a political (not an ethno-national) differentiation between 
Albanians and Kosovans. 
5 Russia is a federation as well, but it is much more centralised than Dayton Bosnia and 
is heavily dominated by the ethnic Russian majority. 
6 7RGD\RWKHUH[DPSOHVLQFOXGHWRQDPHMXVWDIHZZHOONQRZQWKH86$ZKLFKKDVIHGHUDO
and state citizenships, the latter being dependent on residence and therefore changeable; 
Switzerland with its three-tier citizenship (confederation, canton, community); and 
some special territories such as, for instance, Hong Kong and Macao in China, or, for 
that matter, Puerto Rico (since 2007).
7 The anti-fascist council for this region was abolished in March 1945 and the territory 
RI6DQGåDNSUHGRPLQDQWO\SRSXODWHGE\HWKQLF0XVOLPVZDVGLYLGHGEHWZHHQ6HUELD
and Montenegro.
8 At that time the list did not include the Muslim population of Yugoslavia as a separate 
nation. Instead it was considered to be a part of the Serbian, Montenegrin, and Croatian 
nations. The Muslims would be able to declare their ethnicity as “Muslim” from the 
1961 census onwards. They are mentioned as a constituent nation of Yugoslavia in the 
FRQVWLWXWLRQDODPHQGPHQWVRIDVWDWXVZKLFKZDV¿QDOO\FRQ¿UPHGLQWKHODVW
Yugoslav constitution of 1974.
9 5HSXEOLFOHYHOFLWL]HQVKLSVZHUHHVWDEOLVKHGLQ&]HFKRVORYDNLDRQO\LQ7KH¿UVW
Soviet republic which enacted its own law on citizenship was Lithuania, but this was 
not until November 1989.
10 The 1953 Constitutional law (art. 12) contains the same provision. The 1963 Constitution, 
however, coupled these rights with duties (art. 118), a measure which was also incorporated 
LQWRWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQRIWKH6)5<-RYDQRYLü
11 2I¿FLDO*D]HWWH
12 Following major constitutional changes in Yugoslavia and subsequent changes to the 
law on federal citizenship, laws on the citizenship of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-
Herzegovina were adopted in 1950, 1965 and 1977.
13 For instance, Croatian Serbs living in big Croatian cities outside areas where Serbs 
formed majority in Croatia mostly voted for non-ethnic and leftist parties such as 
UHIRUPHGFRPPXQLVWVVHH6WRNHVet al. 2005: 7).
14 6OXåEHQL/LVW5%,+2I¿FLDO*D]HWWHRIWKH5HSXEOLFRI%RVQLD+HU]HJRYLQD
amended on 23 April 1993 (SL RBIH 11/1993) and on 16 December 1993 (SL RBIH 
27/1993).
15 Originally art. 29 allowed acquisition of Bosnian citizenship to citizens of other Yugoslav 
republics only after 5 years of continuous residence for those born in Bosnia, and 10 
\HDUVRIUHVLGHQFHIRUWKRVHZKRZHUHQRWERUQLQ%RVQLD81+&50XPLQRYLü
1998: 77).
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16 After its declaration of independence from Serbia in 2008, Kosovo adopted its own 
law on citizenship which declared that Kosovo citizens were all citizens of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia who resided in Kosovo on 1 January 1998. This is the only 
H[DPSOH RI%UXEDNHU¶V ³QHZ VWDWHPRGHO´ LQ WKH IRUPHU<XJRVODYLD DQG DV VXFK LW
resembles citizenship policies adopted in some republics of the former Soviet Union. I 
DPJUDWHIXOWR*s]LP.UDVQLTLIRUWKLVUHPDUN+HUHRQHKDVWRWDNHLQWRDFFRXQWWKDW
Kosovo as an autonomous province did not have its own citizenship but its citizens had 
Serbia’s republican-level citizenship. Also, Kosovo’s citizenship law was designed in 
close collaboration with supervising international bodies.
17 It would be interesting to establish what the real military potential of these (male) 
residents was. It was probably not very strong. On the other hand, the 1993 amendments 
to Bosnia-Herzegovina’s decree on citizenship facilitated the naturalisation of those 
who had beenDFWLYHO\LQYROYHGLQWKHGHIHQVHIRUFHV0XPLQRYLü%RVQLDQ
citizenship was granted on this basis to a limited number of foreigners, mostly from 
,VODPLFFRXQWULHVZKRKDGIRXJKWRQWKH%RVQLDNVLGH,Q0D\DQHZO\IRUPHG
FRPPLVVLRQ FRPSULVLQJ ORFDO DQG LQWHUQDWLRQDOPHPEHUV ODXQFKHG D ¿QDO UHYLVLRQ
of all naturalisations from 1992 to 2005. According to some sources, 20,000 people 
were in possession of a citizenship status which was considered to be problematic 
LQFOXGLQJ,VODPLF¿JKWHUV6HUEVIURP6HUELDDQG&URDWLDZKRDFTXLUHGFLWL]HQVKLS
IURP WKH 6HUE HQWLW\ DQG HWKQLF %RVQLDNV IURP WKH 6DQGåDN UHJLRQ 6HUELD DQG
0RQWHQHJURZKRZHUHQDWXUDOLVHGLQWKH%RVQLDN&URDWHQWLW\6HH³6SRUQR
GUåDYOMDQVWDYD” [20,000 Citizenship Statuses Contested] in Slobodna Dalmacija, 
14 May 2005, Split: http://www.slobodnadalmacija.hr/20050514/bih03.asp. Between 
0DUFKDQG'HFHPEHUWKH&RPPLVVLRQUHYRNHGWKH%RVQLDQFLWL]HQVKLSRI
DURXQGSHUVRQVDQGLQWKH¿UVWKDOIRIRIDQRWKHUSHUVRQV7KHPDMRULW\
of them came from African or Asian Islamic countries. Apparently, a great number 
of these individuals does not reside in Bosnia anymore. See “2GX]HWR  SDVRãD
BiH´>%RVQLDQ3DVVSRUWV5HYRNHG´@LQ3UHVV2QOLQH, 21 October 2008:  
http://www.pressonline.rs/page/stories/sr.html?view=story&id=49615&sectionId=51.
18 The Parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina adopted an amendment to the Constitution 
UHJXODWLQJWKHVWDWXVRIWKHGLVWULFWRI%UþNRRQ0DUFK
19 )RUWKHGHFLVLRQ8VHHWKHRI¿FLDOZHEVLWHRIWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQDO&RXUWRI%RVQLD
Herzegovina http://www.ccbh.ba
20 The “Dayton” Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Annex IV of the Peace Agreement) 
GH¿QHVFLWL]HQVKLSWKXV³&LWL]HQVKLSRI%RVQLDDQG+HU]HJRYLQDWREHUHJXODWHGE\
the Parliamentary Assembly, and a citizenship of each Entity, to be regulated by each 
Entity, provided that: all citizens of either Entity are thereby citizens of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina” (art. 1, para 7 – Citizenship). High representative Carlos Westendorp 
enacted the citizenship law on December 16, 1997 with effect from 1 January 1998.
21 The Court’s press release is available at http://www.coe.org.rs/eng/news_sr_
eng/?conid=1545
22 &URDWLDDQG%RVQLDVLJQHGWKHELODWHUDODJUHHPHQWLQ6SULQJEXWLWVUDWL¿FDWLRQ
is still pending. 
23 See “'UåDYOMDQVWYRXJRGLQDGRELORYLãHRGPLOLMXQRVRED” [In Fifteen Years More 
Than One Million Persons Acquired [Croatian] Citizenship], Vjesnik, 13 September 
2006, available at KWWSZZZYMHVQLNKUKWPO&ODQDNDVS"U WHP	F 

“Being Citizen the Bosnian Way”
24 In July 2009 the European commission proposed visa liberalisation for Macedonia, 
6HUELDDQG0RQWHQHJURIRUWKHODWWHUWZRXSRQFRPSOHWLRQRIDGGLWLRQDO³KRPHZRUN´
as of 1 January 2010. The Commission also concluded that Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Kosovo and Albania did not satisfy criteria for liberalisation of the EU visa regime. 
7KLVSURYRNHGD¿HUFHGHEDWHHVSHFLDOO\LQ%RVQLD+HU]HJRYLQD0DQ\SRLQWRXWWKDW
WKLVPHDVXUHEDVLFDOO\SXQLVKHVRQO\RQHHWKQLFJURXS%RVQLDNVVLQFH&URDWVZLOOEH
able to travel freely to the EU with Croatian passports and many Serbs will be able to 
travel with their Serbian passports. Moreover, the visa liberalisation policy of the EU 
could motivate more Bosnian Serbs to acquire Serbian citizenship.
25 6HH WKH RI¿FLDOZHESDJH RI WKH(OHFWRUDO&RPPLVVLRQhttp://www.izbori.hr/izbori/
L]ERULQVI¿"RSHQIRUP
